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Miller: Miranda or Its Equivalent

MIRANDA OR ITS EQUIVALENT: THE TWO “W’S” OF
REASONABLE CONVEYANCE
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Dunbar1
(decided on October 28, 2014)

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Miranda v. Arizona2 the United States Supreme Court required that certain warnings must be conveyed to the individual being
questioned during a custodial interrogation.3 An adequate warning
must inform the individual: (1) of “the right to remain silent”; (2)
“that anything said can be used against the individual in court”; (3) of
the right to have counsel present during questioning prior to trial; and
(4) if one cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed.4 Only after this warning “or its equivalent” has been given may statements
made during questioning be introduced at trial.5 The ambiguity in the
phrase “or its equivalent” is where interpretation issues arise.6
1

23 N.E.3d 946 (N.Y. 2014).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 Id. at 478-79. See id. at 444 (“By custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.”); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495
(1977) (“Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’ ”); and Rhode Island v. Innis 446 U.S. 291,
301 (1980) (The Court extended custodial interrogation to include “any words or actions on
the part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”).
See also J.F. Ghent, What Constitutes “Custodial Interrogation” Within Rule of Miranda v.
Arizona Requiring that Suspect be Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before
Custodial Interrogation, 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).
4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-74.
5 Id. at 478-79. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 297.
6 Right to Remain Silent Not Understood by Many Suspects, AMERICAN P SYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2011/08/remain2
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In 2007, the Queens County District Attorney implemented a
pre-arraignment interview procedure.7 Pursuant to the procedure an
assistant district attorney and a detective investigator would conduct
an interview with a suspect, which occurred before a suspect was arraigned.8 The detective investigator would begin the interview with a
“scripted preamble” to the Miranda warnings.9 The preamble included the following statements:
If you have an alibi, give me as much information as
you can, including the names of any people you were
with; If your version of what happened is different
from what we’ve been told, this is your opportunity to
tell us your story; If there is something you need us to
investigate about this case you have to tell us now so
we can look into it; This will be your only opportunity
to speak with us before you go to court on these
charges.10
The defendants in People v. Dunbar,11 Jermaine Dunbar and
Collin F. Lloyd-Douglas (the “defendants”), were both questioned using this method.12 The New York Court of Appeals held that the preamble undermined the protection required by Miranda, and therefore
the defendants’ statements during the interview were inadmissible.13
The court found that the confusing and contradictory nature of the
preamble negated the effect of the Miranda warnings that followed.14
This case note will begin with a discussion of Dunbar folsilent.aspx (“More than 800 different versions of Miranda warnings are used by police agencies across the United States, and vary in reading level from second grade to post-college
level.”).
7 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 947.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 947-48.
10 Id. at 948.
11 Id. at 946.
12 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 947-50.
13 Id. at 953.
14 Id. See also People v. Perez, 946 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 2012). Dunbar
was not the first case to challenge the Preamble-Miranda Warning Procedure. Id. During the
suppression hearing initiated by the defendant in Perez, the court found that the preamble
violated the New York Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c). Id. at 842-45. Rule 8.4(c) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation.” NEW YORK S TATE RULES OF P ROF’ L
CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2013), http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/jointappellate/NY-Rules-ProfConduct-1200.pdf. The preamble’s statement to investigate followed by the People’s failure
to do so is a direct violation of that rule. Perez, 946 N.Y.S at 842-45.
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lowed by an analysis of the purpose and rationale behind the Miranda
decision. This note then will argue that an acceptable warning may
state the warning in Miranda or its equivalent, thus establishing the
principle of “reasonable conveyance.” In the next section, the note
will examine how New York courts have applied Miranda and what
constitutes acceptable deviations from the exact formulation stated by
the Supreme Court in the Miranda opinion. The note will demonstrate that the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Dunbar is
consistent with Miranda and the subsequent federal and New York
State case law.
II.

THE ROAD TO THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
A.

Jermaine Dunbar

Jermaine Dunbar was taken into custody on April 23, 2009,
after he was identified as a suspect in connection with an armed robbery.15 Before arraignment, an assistant district attorney and a detective investigator interviewed Dunbar.16 The assistant district attorney
and the detective investigator delivered the scripted preamble, the
Miranda rights, and then informed Dunbar that the interview was being taped.17 Dunbar demonstrated an understanding of his rights and
participated in the questioning.18 The information gathered from the
interview led to his being charged with second-degree attempted robbery and other crimes.19 The People sought to introduce Dunbar’s
statements at his trial.20 Dunbar made a motion to suppress his
statements arguing that the “scripted preamble” to the interview violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination.21 However,
the prosecution claimed that the statements were a result of a valid
Miranda warning and waiver.22
After a review of the totality of the circumstances, the Sup-

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 948.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 948-49.
Id. at 949.
Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 949.
Id.
Id.
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pression Court denied Dunbar’s motion.23 The court concluded that
the statements were made after an adequate Miranda warning and a
voluntary waiver.24 Therefore, Dunbar’s statements were admissible
at trial.25 The jury convicted Dunbar and the Queens County Supreme Court sentenced Dunbar to prison for a term of seventeen
years to life.26
B.

Collin F. Lloyd-Douglas

Collin F. Lloyd-Douglas was taken into custody on June 12,
2008 due to a violent altercation that took place in 2005 between
Lloyd-Douglas and a woman he was romantically involved with.27
Similar to Dunbar, an assistant district attorney and a detective investigator interviewed Lloyd-Douglas before arraignment.28 Following
the recitation of the preamble and Miranda warnings, he was informed that the interview was being taped.29 Lloyd-Douglas was
charged with numerous crimes including attempted murder in the
second degree, first-degree assault, and first-degree robbery.30 The
People sought to introduce the incriminating statements made at trial.31 Lloyd-Douglas alleged that his statements were not voluntarily
made because he had been held at booking for twenty-two hours and
had not been asked if he needed to use the facilities or if he wanted
any water or food.32 Lloyd-Douglas’ suppression motion had a similar result to that of Dunbar’s.33 The Judicial Hearing Officer determined that his statements “were made pursuant to his knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights.”34
Subsequently, the jury convicted Lloyd-Douglas and the Queens
County Supreme Court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison.35

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id.
Id.
Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 949.
Id.
Id. at 949-50.
Id.
Id.
Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 950.
Id.
Id. at 950.
Id. at 950-51.
Id. at 951.
Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 951.
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The Appellate Decision

On appeal, the Appellate Division for the Second Department
reversed the trial court’s decisions in both Dunbar’s and LloydDouglas’s cases.36 The Appellate Court found that the addition of the
preamble “prevent[ed the Miranda warnings] from effectively conveying to the suspects their rights . . . , convey[ing] a ‘muddled and
ambiguous’ message.”37 The court held that the preamble effected a
negation of the rights granted by the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, due to its confusing and misleading nature.38 The
Appellate Court ordered a new trial.39
III.

THE DUNBAR DECISION

The New York Court of Appeals consolidated both Dunbar’s
and Lloyd-Douglas’s cases for the purposes of the appeal.40 On review, the court concluded that the preamble “effectively vitiated or at
least neutralized the effect of the subsequent-delivered Miranda
warnings.”41
The court began its analysis by citing Miranda v. Arizona,42
which established that a person, prior to an interrogation by law enforcement, “must be adequately and effectively apprised of his
rights” provided by the Fifth Amendment.43 The Fifth Amendment
protects individuals against self-incrimination and is applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 The Miranda warnings are an “absolute prerequisite to inter36

Id.
See People v. Dunbar, 958 N.Y.S.2d 764, 772 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013); see also People v. Lloyd-Douglas, 958 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013) (holding that
“[b]ecause this procedure was not effective to secure the defendant's fundamental constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel, the defendant's videotaped
statement should have been suppressed.”).
38 Dunbar, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 772; Lloyd-Douglas, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
39 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 951.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 953. See id. at 948 (demonstrating the rejection of the preamble by the number of
times the opinion states the court’s holding: “the preamble undermined the subsequentlycommunicated Miranda warnings to the extent that Dunbar and Lloyd-Douglas were not
‘adequately and effectively’ advised of the choice [the Fifth Amendment] guarantees’
against self-incrimination before they agreed to speak with law enforcement authorities.”).
42 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 951.
44 U.S. C ONST . amend. V. (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a
37
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rogation.”45
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the State’s argument that Dunbar and Lloyd-Douglas’s statements were admissible
following the preamble and the Miranda warning, reasoning that
simply stating the warnings is not enough in every situation. 46 If the
warning fails to “convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda” it will not be found sufficient.47 The court found the preamble
contradicted the subsequent Miranda warnings that were given and it
created an atmosphere where keeping silent would be detrimental to
one’s case.48 Specifically, the fact that “remaining silent or invoking
the right to counsel would come at a price––they would be giving up
a valuable opportunity to speak with an assistant district attorney, to
have their cases investigated or to assert alibi defenses.”49 Accordingly, the preamble coupled with the Miranda warning failed to convey the necessary rights.50
IV.

MIRANDA V. ARIZONA

An explanation of the federal case law protecting compelled
self-incrimination is necessary in order to demonstrate why the preamble undermines a constitutionally protected right. The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides the privilege
against self-incrimination––specifically, “[n]o person shall be . . .
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”51
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the historic case Miranda
v. Arizona,52 extended the protections provided by the Constitution to
individuals during a custodial interrogation.53
The United States Supreme Court held that a state agent must
inform a person of his or her Fifth Amendment privileges prior to any
witness against himself.”).
45 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 951.
46 Id. at 952-53; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (“Cases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”).
47 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 952-53.
48 Id. at 953.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 U.S. C ONST . amend. V.
52 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53 Id. at. 439.
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custodial questioning.54 The Court concluded that an individual
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.55
The required warnings are necessary safeguards to ensure that any
statements made are the result of free choice.56 The procedural safeguards required in an interrogation include the Miranda warnings “or
their equivalent.”57
The rationale behind the Court’s holding in Miranda provides
a foundation for the decisions that follow and establishes what is considered an adequate equivalent.58 The Court cited two primary reasons to support the need for “safeguards” throughout its opinion.59
First, the Court examined the environment and circumstances surrounding a custodial interrogation, such as the psychological effect of
an interrogation.60 Due to the very nature of the act, police interrogation is at odds with the free will of the accused.61 The person being
questioned is cut off from the outside world, confined to a room with
law enforcement personnel, in an unfamiliar setting.62 The Court
54

Id. at 471.
Id. at 479; see id. at 469 (“The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in
court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege but also
of the consequences of foregoing it.”); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466 (“The presence of
an attorney, and the warnings delivered to the individual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that
eliminates the evils of the interrogation process.”).
56 Id. at 457-58.
57 See Innis, 466 U.S. at 297.
58 See infra note 60.
59 Miranda, 384 U.S.at 455.
60 Id. (noting that the prevention of “psychological harm” is a natural follow up to the previously decided unlawful nature of the use of “physical harm”). Id. The Court found that
the law enforcement personnel had experience in obtaining confessions. Id. at 448-52. This
was evident after an examination of police manuals that provided tips for obtaining a confession. Id. See also id. at 450 (“These tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological
state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already––that
he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and discouraged.”).
61 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (rejecting the argument “that society’s need for interrogation
outweighs the privilege”).
62 Id. at 449-50.
55
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found that the nature of the interrogation procedure is at times “to
subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.”63 A person
could easily be manipulated due to the toll of interrogation.64
The opinion relied on case law concerning compelled confessions and the privilege against self-incrimination.65 Specifically, the
Court cited Bram v. United States,66 which provided guidance for determining if a confession was truly voluntary.67 The Court concluded
that when an individual makes “a statement when but for the improper influences he would have remained silent” the words are not voluntary.68 The Court found that “establishing merely that the confession was not induced by promise or threat” does not prove
voluntariness.69 In order to meet this threshold, the making of communication must be voluntary and any evidence of compulsion will
render the statements inadmissible.70 The Court concluded that a
waiver must be explicit and rejected the presumption of a waiver due
to silence.71
Second, the Court addressed the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination and the applicability of said rights in state court
proceedings.72 The Court began its discussion of the protection
against compelled confession with Escobedo v. State of Illinois.73
The Court held in Escobedo that the defendant was not adequately
advised of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because
the emotional state of the defendant had led to a diminished capacity
for “rational judgment.”74 In Escobedo, law enforcement repeatedly
denied the defendant’s request for counsel.75 The position the defendant was in created an environment designed to “produce upon his
mind the fear that, if he remained silent, it would be considered an
63 Id. at 457. Id. at 450 (noting that “the manuals instruct the police to display an air of
confidence in the suspect’s guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in
confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact.”).
64 Id.
65 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460-62.
66 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
67 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
68 Id. at 462 (citing Bram, 168 U.S. at 549).
69 Id.
70 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462. See Bram, 168 U.S. 532.
71 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
72 Miranda, 384 U.S.at 458-66.
73 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440-42, 465-66.
74 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 385-86.
75 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 385-86.
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admission of guilt.”76 Therefore, the defendant did not competently
or knowingly waive his rights because he was not adequately informed of his rights.77
After an examination of the nature and environment of an interrogation and the history behind Miranda, the Court concluded that
“only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of [these]
right[s] can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise [them].”78
V.

THE TWO “W’S” OF DEFINING “REASONABLY CONVEY”

After the Miranda decision, the Supreme Court decided multiple cases that clarified what is considered to be an adequate “safeguard.” This was in part due to the fact that the Court in Miranda only dictated the rights that are to be conveyed by the warning––the
Court did not dictate the actual language to be used.79 States have the
discretion to script their own warnings; however, issues arise when
the deviation from the Miranda warnings fails to adequately inform
the detainee of the protections required by Miranda.80 The safeguard
issues can be broken up into two categories: (1) the language used,
and (2) the timing of the warning.
A.

The “What?” of Reasonably Conveyance

The United States Supreme Court has held that additional
language or a change in the wording of the warning does not automatically render the warning ineffective or in violation of the holding

76

Id. at 485.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465-66. See also id. at 465 (“[T]he compelling atmosphere of the
in-custody interrogation, and not an independent decision on [the defendant’s] part, caused
the defendant to speak.”); Id. at 466 (“The presence of an attorney, and the warnings delivered to the individual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell
his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils of the interrogation
process.”).
78 Id. at 473.
79 Id. at 476. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (“This Court has never
indicated that the rigidity of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant.”); Innis, 466 U.S. at 297 (explaining that the acceptable safeguards
are “Miranda warnings . . . or their equivalent”); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202-03
(1989) (“We have never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described
in that decision.”).
80 See supra notes 4-6.
77
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in Miranda.81 For instance, the Court in California v. Prysock82 provided clarity on acceptable deviations from the language of Miranda.83 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the detainee
was adequately advised of the Miranda warning with concern to the
right to counsel.84 The specific issue was whether “the right to appointed counsel was linked with some future point in time after police interrogation,” thus in violation of Miranda.85 Specifically the
language at issue was “[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer before
you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being
questioned, and all during the questioning” and “[y]ou all, uh – if, –
you have the right to have a lawyer appointed to represent you at no
cost to yourself.”86 After each statement the officer asked the defendant if he understood his rights, and the defendant answered in the
affirmative.87
The Court held that the additional language in Prysock did not
act in contravention of Miranda.88 The Court supported its holding
by citing to prior cases where lower courts rejected warnings as violative of Miranda.89 Specifically, a violation did not occur when the
additional language used, with concern to appointed counsel, “was
linked to a future point in time after police interrogation.”90 The
81

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490.
We have already pointed out that the Constitution does not require any
specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against selfincrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and the States are
free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are
fully as effective as those described above in informing accused persons
of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.

Id.
82

453 U.S. 355 (1981).
Id. at 359-60.
84 Id. at 360.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 356-57.
87 Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356-57.
88 Id. at 362.
89 Id. at 360.
90 Id. See United States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 134, 134 (9th Cir. 1970) (rejecting the notion
that one could “have an attorney appointed to represent you when you first appear before the
U.S. Commissioner or the Court.”); People v. Bolinski, 67 Cal. Rptr. 347 358-61 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1968). The court there rejected two different warnings as inadequate. Id. The first “if
he was charged . . . he would be appointed counsel” and the second concerned a defendant
who was being moved to another state and was told that “the court would appoint an attorney” after he was moved. Id.
83
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Court found that the additional language in the supportive cases
failed to inform the suspect of his right to counsel during such interrogation.91 The Court distinguished these warnings from the warnings given to the defendant in Prysock, and found that nothing “suggested any limitation on the right to the presence of appointed
counsel.”92 Thus, the Court held the warnings given to the defendant
were consistent with Miranda because he was fully informed of his
rights.93 The language used did not undermine the warnings granted
in Miranda, nor did it manipulate the warnings to the advantage of
the questioner.94
The issue was re-addressed in Duckworth v. Eagan95 eight
years later. The warning in that case included all the requirements of
Miranda.96 The detainee was told of her right to remain silent and
her right to an attorney.97 However, the police added the language “if
and when you go to court” to the warning given with respect to counsel.98 The United States Supreme Court held that the warnings “in
their totality” were in compliance with Miranda.99 The Court supported its holding with two rationales.100 First, the language did not
undermine the Miranda warnings because the additional language
could be reasonably deemed in anticipation of a common question:
When does one have an attorney appointed?101 The Court saw the
statement as advice, which was consistent with Miranda.102 Second,
the required information, that “he has a right to an attorney before
and during questioning,” was still conveyed to the detainee. 103 The
free will of the detainee was still intact.104
Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Powell105 further clarified what an acceptable deviation from the exact
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360.
Id. at 360-61.
Id.
Id. at 361-62.
492 U.S. 195 (1989).
Id. at 198-99.
Id.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 205.
Duckworth, 492 U.S at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 203.
559 U.S. 50 (2010).
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warnings dictated in Miranda.106 The police force had taken the defendant into custody and delivered their equivalent to Miranda warnings before any questioning, stating:
You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the
right to remain silent, anything you say can be used
against you in court. You have the right to talk to a
lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you
cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed
for you without cost and before any questioning. You
have the right to use any of these rights at any time
you want during this interview.107
After the defendant signed a form to confirm that he understood his
rights, he chose to speak with the officers, which led to a confession
and subsequent indictment.108 The defendant moved to have the
statements suppressed claiming the Miranda warnings he was given
were defective.109 On certiorari, the Court expressed the issue simply, as “whether the warnings reasonably ‘conve[yed] to [a suspect]
his rights as required by Miranda.’”110 The Court concluded that the
warnings given were sufficient because they “did not ‘entirely omi[t]’
any information Miranda required them to impart.”111 The warnings
were deemed to reasonably convey the defendant’s right to have an
attorney present at any time.112 A consistent feature of the cases in
this section is the consistency with respect to the standard the equivalent warning must meet; however, the Court’s analysis varies depending on the specific facts of each case.
B.

The “When?” of Reasonably Convey

The Court’s analysis of when the warning must be recited relies on whether the timing of the warning hampers the detained individual’s ability to truly exercise his or her constitutional rights.113 In

106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 60-62.
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Powell, 559 U.S. at 60. See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203; Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361.
Powell, 559 U.S. at 62.
Id.
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
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Missouri v. Seibert,114 the Court addressed the issue concerning the
adequacy of a Miranda warning given mid-questioning.115 The defendant was taken into custody and was subsequently questioned by a
police officer for thirty to forty minutes.116 Following the officer’s
questioning, the defendant signed a waiver after she was informed of
her Miranda warnings.117 However, prior to the warning, the defendant had already confessed to the crime she was being questioned
about.118 At trial, the defendant sought to suppress both the statements made pre-Miranda and post-Miranda.119 The trial court admitted the statements made after the warning.120 As a result, Seibert was
charged and convicted of first-degree murder and various other
crimes.121 However, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and concluded that “the second statement, clearly the product of the invalid
first statement, should have been suppressed.”122
The Supreme Court’s decision in Seibert established that Miranda warnings made after an interrogation begins are unacceptable
and a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.123 The Miranda opinion clearly demonstrated that
the warning must be given prior to any questioning to achieve its intended purpose.124 A warning in the middle of questioning does not
have the same effect as a warning given prior to any questioning.125
The questioning after the Miranda warning coerced the defendant into answering consistently with her prior statements.126 Further, the
statements that the defendant made before the Miranda warning
could in a sense be seen as being held against her because the second
round of questioning used the information from the pre-Miranda
questioning to obtain an admissible confession.127
114

Id.
Id. at 604.
116 Id. at 604-5.
117 Id. at 605.
118 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605.
119 Id. at 605-06.
120 Id. at 606.
121 Id. at 605-07.
122 Id.
123 Seibert, 542 at 617.
124 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.
125 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612-13.
126 Id. at 605.
127 Id. at 613, 616 (The Court noted that the question-warn-question sequence is a “police
strategy adopted to undermine the Miranda warnings.”).
115
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Miranda does not create a scripted straitjacket for custodial
interrogation.128 The cases described above establish the premise that
the failure to give the exact warning dictated in Miranda will not automatically render the statements inadmissible and the mere recitation
of the Miranda warning will not render statements admissible.
A.

The “What?” of Reasonably Convey Applied to the
Preamble in Dunbar

First, the language of the preamble given to Dunbar and
Lloyd-Douglas failed to reasonably convey the necessary rights and
privileges granted to the defendants.129 The Supreme Court requires
an inquiry into whether the “equivalent” warning is consistent with
the warnings required by Miranda to determine whether the language
is acceptable.130 The Court has defined a warning consistent with Miranda as a warning that “reasonably conveys” the rights granted.131
The rights must be clearly stated in order to insure a detainee understands them. The preamble lacks clarity.
The preamble to the Miranda warnings that the defendants
were given failed to reasonably convey the privileges that protect
against self-incrimination because the preamble could be seen as a
limitation on the right to remain silent.132 The preamble’s contradictory terms dilute the Miranda warnings that follow.133 The preamble
told the defendants “this is your opportunity to tell us your story,”
and to “give me as much information as you can.”134 These statements are contradictory to the Miranda warning that followed, which
informed them that they do have “the right to remain silent.”135
The preamble also posed a limitation on the right to coun-

128

See supra note 78.
See supra note 41.
130 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 952-53.
131 Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361 (concluding that a deviation from the order of the warning in
Miranda does not render the warning inadequate).
132 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 948.
129
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sel.136 The scripted preamble included the statement “this will be
your only opportunity to speak with us before you go to court on
these charges.”137 Consequently, the preamble conveys that a right to
counsel was not available during the pre-arraignment questioning and
prior to seeing a judge.138
Further, the introduction before the warning could be seen as
insinuating that collaboration and cooperation with law enforcement
would help the defendants’ cases.139 The United States Supreme
Court has noted in numerous cases that the surrounding circumstances of a criminal defendant’s interrogation requires a heightened protection of his or her rights against self-incrimination.140 The fact that
the defendants were told that a subsequent investigation would be
conducted if they spoke to the investigators was in direct conflict
with the requisite warning that “anything they said could and would
be used against them.”141 The preamble allowed the investigator and
the district attorney to take advantage of the fear and uncertainty already present.142 This specific manipulation of the Miranda warning
requirement is unacceptable and fails to meet the threshold the courts
require.143
The dissenting opinion in Dunbar distinguished persuasion
from trickery.144 The dissent contended that persuasion is an important tool for law enforcement.145 Further, it argued that the use of
persuasion does not desecrate the Miranda warnings.146 However,
this argument is easily rebuttable.147 The preamble’s effect on the
Miranda warnings goes beyond persuasion.148 A reasonable inference drawn after an examination of the preamble is that refraining
from talking could potentially come at a price, while discussion of the
136

Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953.
Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 952-53.
141 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 954-55 (Smith, J., dissenting) (reasoning that “Miranda does not require law enforcement officials to repress, or forbid them to encourage, the tendency of criminals to talk
too much.”).
145 Id.
146 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 954-55.
147 Id. at 953.
148 Id.
137
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occurrence could be to the detainee’s advantage.149
B.

The “When?” of Reasonably Convey Applied to
the Preamble in Dunbar

The recitation of Miranda or an equivalent does not automatically render the detainee’s statements admissible. In Seibert the midquestioning Miranda warning procedure failed to adequately advise
the defendant of her privileges.150 The procedure’s effect was contrary to the purpose the United States Supreme Court sought to further
in Miranda, thereby undermining its holding.151 The procedure in
Dunbar––the preamble followed by the Miranda warnings––is comparable to the procedure in Seibert.152 A valid conclusion could be
that the preamble followed by the contradictory Miranda warnings in
a way cancel each other.153 Consequently, both are inconsistent with
the Court’s purpose and intent in Miranda.154
Furthermore, the preamble in general does not convey the desired purpose of the Miranda warnings.155 The purpose of Miranda is
to inform the defendant of his or her rights and thereby put the defendant in a position to exercise the right if he or she chooses to do
so.156 The People allege that the “purpose of the [preamble] was to
get exculpatory information from the innocent; not exculpatory
statements or evidence.”157 It is doubtful that this is the legitimate
reason for the practice and instead the primary purpose is to circumvent the Miranda warnings that follow the preamble.
The Court has suggested that each sentence or thought in the
warnings has a purpose.158 For example, the phrase “you have the
right to remain silent” is immediately followed by the phrase “anything you say can be used against you in the court of law.”159 This

149

Id.
Id. at 952-53.
151 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 952-53.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 953.
155 Id.
156 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (“Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose
between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.”).
157 Dunbar, 958 N.Y.S.2d 777.
158 Dunbar, 23 N.E. at 953.
159 Id. at 952-53.
150
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format is desired to adequately inform the detainee of a cause and effect of speaking.160 Thus, the individual being questioned is made
aware of the right to remain silent and the consequences if he chooses
to assert or not to assert the right.161 In Dunbar, the preamble immediately followed by the Miranda warning renders the warning similar
to the defective warning in Seibert, in that the manipulation of when
the warning is given is being used to obtain a confession.162 Thus,
the timing of the preamble takes away from the Miranda warnings
that followed.163
Therefore, the preamble is a contradiction of the Miranda
warnings that followed.164 A reasonable conclusion drawn is that the
two separate phrases negate each other.165 It can be argued that a Miranda warning was not given at all, and without further inquiry, the
statements made during the interrogation would be inadmissible.166
“REASONABLE CONVEYANCE” IN NEW YORK

VII.

The New York State Constitution’s provision protecting the
accused is exactly the same as its United States Constitution’s counterpart, which provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”167 Although New
York has a history of expanding the protection of constitutionally
protected rights, the case law has demonstrated a consistent adherence to the federal law established in Miranda and its progeny.168
A.

The “What?” of Reasonable Conveyance in New
York

New York State case law is consistent with federal case law
on the topic of additional language and the effect of the Miranda
warning. For instance, in People v. Lewis,169 the court rejected the
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953.
Id.
Id. at 952-53.
Id. at 953.
Id.
Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953.
Id.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
See 20 N.Y. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 31.
557 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1990).
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defendant’s claim that the addition of “[n]ow that I have advised you
of your rights, are you willing to answer questions” negated the Miranda warning that had preceded.170 The court reasoned that the
warnings in their totality were acceptable because the “words used
convey[ed] the requisite information.”171
Another example of an acceptable addition to the Miranda
warning comes from People v. Bailey.172 In Bailey, the Appellate Division for the Second Department held that the defendant’s statements were admissible.173 Prior to the detective informing the defendant of his Miranda rights, she advised him, “[T]ell me in [your]
own words what took place,” and “[I] want you to tell me what happened.”174 The court concluded that the detective’s additional statements were not “to evoke an incriminating response from the defendant” and thus did not threaten the purpose of the Miranda warnings
that followed.175
The New York State courts have concluded that a ritualistic
formula is not required.176 The only requirement is that the defendant
is made aware of the “requisite information.”177
B.

The “When?” of Reasonable Conveyance in New
York

The New York State courts have consistently applied a “single continuous chain of events” test to determine if the timing of the
Miranda warning is acceptable.178 This inquiry was established in
People v. Chapple.179 In Chapple a state police officer noticed the
defendant walking in the vicinity of where a burglary had recently

170

Id. at 454.
Id.
172 808 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2005).
173 Id. at 301.
174 Id.
175 Id. See also People v. Boyd, 801 N.Y.S.2d 469 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2005).
176 See supra section VII. A.
177 See supra note 166. See also People v. Bartlett, 595 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90-91 (App. Div. 2d
Dep’t 1993) (holding that after the warning required by Miranda the sentence “[i]f you can
not afford to hire a lawyer, one will be furnished for you if you wish, and you have the right
to keep silent until you have had a chance to talk with a lawyer” the suspect was reasonably
conveyed his rights.).
178 341 N.E.2d 243 (N.Y. 1975).
179 Id.
171
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occurred.180 The officer pulled up alongside the defendant in his automobile.181 The officer then informed the defendant that he wanted
to talk to him and told the defendant to get in the car.182 Subsequently, the officer began questioning the defendant as he drove him to the
site of the burglary, culminating in a confession.183 Thereafter, the
officer gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and resumed questioning him.184
The defendant sought to suppress his post-Miranda statements and ultimate confession in the Clinton County Supreme
Court.185 The court stated that the appropriate inquiry is whether
“there is such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that
the defendant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of
one who is not under the influence of questioning.”186 Accordingly,
the court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress because he “was
subjected to such a continuous interrogation that the Miranda warnings administered at the site of the burglary were insufficient to protect his rights.”187
Likewise the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Paul188
man applied the Chapple analysis and concluded that the defendant’s statements were admissible due to the lack of “a continuous
chain of events” between the non-Mirandized and Mirandized questioning.189 The defendant moved to suppress four incriminating
statements he had made to law enforcement even though half of the
statements were made after a Miranda warning.190 The defendant alleged that the earlier questioning tainted the statements following the
Miranda warning.191 The court found a break in the chain of questioning due to “a change in the police personnel involved in the successive interrogatories, which took place in a different location, and
there were significant differences in the methods eliciting infor180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Id. at 244.
Id.
Id.
Chapple, 341 N.E.2d at 244.
Id. at 244-45.
Id.
Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 246.
833 N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 244-47.
Id. at 242.
Id.
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mation.”192 Accordingly, the statements the defendant made after the
Miranda warning were admitted.193 The New York courts have consistently approached motions to suppress statements based on a timing issue in like manner.194
VIII. A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL AND NEW YORK
APPROACHES
The federal and New York State courts have approached the
“reasonable conveyance” threshold in an unusually consistent way.
A common feature of the New York case law is to go beyond the
scope of the federal courts when analyzing a constitutional provision.195 The phenomenon is not present with respect to the implementation of the Miranda holding to New York State cases.
IX.

CONCLUSION

A Miranda warning is a required safeguard. That being said,
the law does not support an inference or an expectation of knowledge
as a responsibility of the suspect during a custodial interrogation.196
As a result, officers delivering the warnings are required to do so in a
clear and concise way.197 The preamble and the Miranda warning in
People v. Dunbar failed to properly deliver the privileges afforded to
a detainee due to its muddled and contradictory language.198 Consequently, with the preamble procedure in place, the pre-arraignment
192

Id. at 245.
Paulman, 833 N.E.2d at 247.
194 See People v. Bethea, 493 N.E.2d 937, 939 (N.Y. 1986) (per curiam) (reaffirming the
rule established in Chapple and as a result suppressing statements made by the defendant
prior and following the Miranda warning. The court supported this conclusion because of
“the close sequence between the unwarned custodial statements in the van and its repetition
soon after defendant arrived at the precinct.”). See also People v. Malaussena, 891 N.E.2d
725 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that the defendant’s confession is admissible. The statements
made before the Miranda warning and after the Miranda warning were not part of a “single
continuous chain of events” due to a four-hour gap between the questioning.).
195 See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] state is free as a matter of its own
law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those the Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.”). See also People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328
(N.Y. 1992) (Fourth Amendment); and O’Neill v. Oakgrove Construction, Inc., 523 N.E.2d
277 (N.Y. 1988) (First Amendment).
196 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-72 (“No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person
may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead.”).
197 Id. at 465-71.
198 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953.
193
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interrogation will most likely never be admissible. Furthermore,
even if the procedure is found to be consistent with Miranda, a waiver of the privileges provided will likely never be accepted. 199 It is in
the best interest of both the detainee and the state to remove the
scripted preamble procedure.
On February 4, 2015, the People of New York petitioned for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.200 The public interest
in criminal procedure, specifically the Miranda rights, arguably could
have persuaded the Court to hear the case.201 However, on May 4,
2015 the Court denied the People’s petition for certiorari.202 In the
event that the Supreme Court did hear the case, it is likely that the
Court would have held that the procedure is unconstitutional and undermines the warnings required by Miranda. Holding otherwise
would contradict all that Miranda seeks to protect.
Amanda Miller*

199 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (“Any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked,
or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his
privilege.”); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S 412, 419 (1986) (The Court found no waiver due to
a deprivation of “information crucial to [the defendant’s] ability to waive his rights knowingly and intelligently.”).
200 New York v. Dunbar, 135 S. Ct. 2052 (2015).
201 See George C. Thomas III, Richard A Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: “Embedded” In Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203 (2002); Russ Buettner, Script
Read to Suspects is Leading to New Trials, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/nyregion/appellate-panel-overturns-3-queensconvictions-based-on-rights-preamble.html?_r=0.html (Dunbar specifically received attention in mainstream media outlets).
202 New York v. Dunbar, 135 S. Ct. 2052 (2015). See People of the State of New York v.
Dunbar, 2015 WL 3408703 (U.S.), 11-12; People of the State of New York v. LloydDouglas, 2015 WL 3408699 (U.S.), 12 (In opposition to the Supreme Court hearing the case
two arguments were asserted. First, the case is now moot because in 2010 the Queens District Attorney’s Office abandoned the “scripted preamble” procedure. Second, the preamble
procedure is not in wide use among the jurisdictions.).
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